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1. Introduction 
Here is a question to which epistemologists have devoted much attention in recent                         
decades: does the disagreement of others give you epistemic reason to reduce your                         
confidence in your own views? Here is a relatively modest answer to this question:                           
“Yes, at least sometimes.” Let’s stipulate that any epistemological theory of                     
disagreement that entails this answer (or something stronger) counts as a version of                         
conciliationism. 
Conciliationism, even in this minimal form, is a controversial view, and we won’t                         
here try to make a final judgment on it. Rather, our aim is to draw attention to what                                   1
we see as a disturbing feature of conciliationism, which has (as far as we’re aware) gone                               
unnoticed in the literature. Roughly put, the trouble is that conciliatory responses to                         
1 Different versions of conciliationism have been defended by Christensen (2007), Elga (2007), Kelly                           
(2010), Lackey (2008), among others. For critics of conciliationism, see Titelbaum (2015), Tal                         
(forthcoming), Smithies (2019), and Weatherson (2019). 
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 in-group disagreement can lead to the frustration of a group’s ​epistemic priorities​: that                         
is, the group’s favoured trade-off between the “Jamesian goals” of ​truth-seeking and                       
error-avoidance​. We’ll say more about what this “Epistemic Priority Problem” (as we’ll                       
henceforth call it) amounts to later on. But before we dive into the details, we’d like to                                 
put the problem into a slightly broader context. 
One of the most exciting ideas to have emerged from the recent flurry of work in                               
collective epistemology (and one of the main reasons, to our mind, why collective                         
epistemology is an interesting and important field of study in its own right) is that                             
epistemically well-performing individuals might make up epistemically ill-performing               
groups and that, conversely, epistemically well-performing groups might be made up                     
of epistemically ill-performing individuals. This idea, broadly construed, is what                   
Mayo-Wilson et al. (2011) refer to as the “Independence Thesis.” The idea has been                           
defended in various forms not only in the epistemological literature but also in the                           
philosophy of science and social choice theory. For example, Goodin (2006) has argued                         
that biased individuals may be able to pool their information in ways that give rise to                               
unbiased groups; Zollman (2010) has argued that scientists who hold on to their                         
theories despite strong evidence against them may help ensure that the broader                       
scientific community doesn’t abandon those theories prematurely; and numerous                 
authors have contributed to the now extensive literature on the “wisdom of crowds”                         
(see Lyon and Pacuit (2013) for an overview). 
The Epistemic Priority Problem, as we will describe it, can be seen as lending                           
further support to the Independence Thesis: it illustrates, in yet another way, how a                           
seemingly rational epistemic practice at the individual level—namely, the practice of                     
conciliating with those who disagree with us—can have adverse epistemic effects at the                         
group level. Whether this result constitutes a problem for conciliationism ​per se​, or                         
whether it simply shows that the true epistemic norms for individual believers can have                           
adverse epistemic consequences at the group level is not a question that will occupy us                             
much. As we see it, the problem raised is an important one to address, even if it doesn’t                                   
give us reason to doubt that conciliationism is true. 
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 For the sake of clarity and definiteness, we’ll embed our discussion of the                         
Epistemic Priority Problem within a general “belief aggregation” framework (more on                     
this framework below). This is not to suggest that the problem is specific to the                             
aggregation-based way of understanding the relationship between the beliefs of a                     
group and those of its members. Indeed, we suspect that very similar problems will                           
arise for alternative ways of understanding group belief as well (though we won’t try to                             
defend this claim here). But the aggregation framework provides a simple and tractable                         
way of making the Epistemic Priority Problem vivid. 
Here, then, is the plan of attack. In §2, we begin by covering some basics of the                                 
belief aggregation framework, and explain in more detail what we mean by saying that                           
a group can have “epistemic priorities.” In §3, we go on to show, in a preliminary way,                                 
how, given certain idealizing assumptions, the Epistemic Priority Problem can arise as a                         
consequence of conciliatory responses to in-group disagreement. In §4, we generalize                     
the problem by showing how it can arise even if we relax the various idealizing                             
assumptions. At this point we’ll have established our main negative lesson. We close on                           
a more positive note in §5 by offering a tentative proposal for how to solve the problem                                 
raised without rejecting conciliationism. 
2. Preliminaries on Belief Aggregation 
As many authors have pointed out, groups are often said to believe things. For                           2
example, a jury might be said to believe that the defendant is guilty; UNESCO might                             
be said to believe that education is a human right; and so on. This raises a natural                                 
question: how (if at all) do the beliefs of a ​group ​relate to those of its ​members​? 
According to a familiar answer, a group’s belief state is (or may be represented as) a                               
function​, or ​aggregate​, of the belief states of its individual members. This “aggregation                         
model” of group belief has featured prominently in the literature on the “doctrinal                         
paradox” and related impossibility results (Kornhauser and Sager 1986; List and Pettit                       
2 For some good entry points into the literature on group belief, see Gilbert (1987; 1989), Tuomela                                 
(1992), List and Pettit (2011), and Lackey (2016). 
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 2002), but has also been used to investigate questions about, e.g., the epistemic merits                           
of co-authorship (Bright et al. 2017), the nature of group justification (Goldman                       
2011), and the normative significance of group disagreement (Skipper and                   
Steglich-Petersen 2019). Here we’d like to use the aggregation framework to illustrate                       3
how the Epistemic Priority Problem can arise as a consequence of conciliatory                       
responses to disagreement among the members of a group. Below we introduce some                         
nuts and bolts that will facilitate the discussion. 
Let a ​belief state ​be a set of propositions (intuitively: the set of propositions                           
believed by the agent in question), and let a ​Belief Aggregation Function (henceforth                         
just a “BAF”) be a function from sets of belief states to single belief states (intuitively:                               
the function taking the belief states of the individual group members as input and                           
returns the belief state of the group as a whole). Familiar BAFs include majority voting,                             
unanimity voting, and dictatorship, but there are many other BAFs that a group might                           
in principle use, and we won’t make any limiting assumptions at the outset about                           
which BAFs are admissible. For example, we won’t assume that a group believes a                           
proposition, ​p​, only if a large enough proportion of its members believe that ​p​.                           
Moreover, we won’t assume that the members of a group must be explicitly aware of                             
which BAF they adhere to. For all we are concerned, a group’s BAF might rather be a                                 
tacit feature of the group’s practice. 
To simplify the discussion, we’ll assume that each group member must either                       
believe or disbelieve any given proposition (suspension of judgment isn’t allowed).                     
Accordingly, we’ll count any credence above 50% as a belief, and we’ll count any                           
credence below 50% as a disbelief (a credence of exactly 50% isn’t allowed). Needless to                             
say, this is a rather strained use of the ordinary term “belief.” But as we’ll see, nothing                                 
of importance is going to turn on this simplification. 
Though not uncontroversial, the aggregation model of group belief is a highly                       
general one, and one that comes with very few substantive assumptions about the                         
metaphysical nature of group belief. For example, as hinted at above, it doesn’t commit                           
3 For a general introduction to the theory of belief aggregation, see Pigozzi (2016). 
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 us to a “summativist” view of group belief, according to which a group’s believing that                             
p is just a matter of all (or a sufficiently high proportion) of its members’ believing that                                 
p​. Indeed, for all the aggregation model says, a group might believe those and only                             4
those propositions that its members unanimously agree are false. This would obviously                       
require an odd BAF (one saying that the group believes ​p ​iff all of the group members                                 
believe ~​p​). But, in principle, the aggregation framework is general enough to                       
accommodate any BAF you like. 
The aggregation model is also silent on whether groups literally have minds of                         
their own, or whether our talk of group belief should be understood in a less                             
metaphysically committal way. To ease the exposition, we’ll continue to talk as if                         
groups, like their members, have genuine beliefs. But all we assume on the official story                             
is that a group’s belief state, whatever its metaphysical status, may be usefully                         
represented as a function of the belief states of its members. 
Just as individuals can be more or less epistemically reliable, groups can be more or                             
less epistemically reliable as well: that is, their beliefs can “line up” with the truth in                               
more or less accurate ways. They can do so in (at least) two different ways,                             
corresponding to two different kinds reliability. On the one hand, there is an agent’s                           
positive reliability​: that is, the probability that the agent believes that ​p given that ​p is                               
true. On the other hand, there is the agent’s ​negative reliability​: that is, the probability                             
that the agent doesn’t believe that ​p ​given that ​p ​is false. Formally (cf. List 2005): 
Positive reliability:​ ​Pr​(​Bp|p​) 
Negative reliability:​ ​Pr​(​~Bp|~p​) 
As William James (1896) famously pointed out, these two kinds of reliability do                         
not always go hand in hand. In fact, they can come arbitrarily far apart. A highly                               
credulous agent—someone who is willing to believe even the most improbable of                       
propositions—will have a very high positive reliability, but a very low negative                       
reliability. Such an agent will rarely miss out the truth, but at the cost of forming lots                                 
4 See Gilbert (1989) for an early discussion of summativist ​vs​ non-summativist views of group belief. 
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 of false beliefs. Conversely, a highly incredulous agent—someone who is unwilling to                       
believe even the most probable of propositions—will have a very low positive                       
reliability, but a very high negative reliability. Such an agent will rarely form false                           
beliefs, but at the cost of often missing out on the truth. 
Here is an uncontroversial fact that will be important for what follows: different                         
BAFs contribute in different ways to a group’s positive and negative reliability. To take                           
a simple example, consider a group with ​n members, where each member has the same                             
positive and negative reliability, ​r​. Given this, the group’s positive and negative                       
reliability will vary quite significantly, depending on what BAF the group uses. For                         
example, unanimity voting will tend to yield a much higher negative reliability than                         
majority voting, whereas majority voting will tend to yield a much higher positive                         
reliability than unanimity voting (see Table 1 and Figure 1).  5
We take this to suggest that what BAF it is advisable for a group to use depends, at                                   
least in part, on the group’s ​epistemic priorities​: that is, the group’s preferred trade-off                           
between ​believing what is true and ​not believing what is false (or: the group’s preferred                             
trade-off between positive reliability and negative reliability). For example, if the group                       
described above (consisting of ​n ​members with identical positive and negative                     
reliability, ​r​) places more weight on negative reliability than positive reliability,                     
unanimity voting will be preferable to majority voting. By contrast, if the group places                           
equal weight on positive reliability and negative reliability, majority voting will be                       
preferable to unanimity voting. 
So far, so good. But what is the ​right ​trade-off between positive and negative                           
reliability? In other words, what epistemic priorities ​should ​a group have? A natural                         
first reaction to this question would be to say, on grounds of uniformity, that groups                             
should simply have whatever epistemic priorities ​individuals should have. And many                     
epistemologists have been inclined to think that individuals should be epistemically                     
risk-averse​, that is, that they should place more weight on error-avoidance than on                         
5 Here and elsewhere we assume that the group members are independent of each other: that is, any                                   
given member’s belief about ​p​ isn’t affected by any other member’s belief about ​p​. 
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 truth-seeking. If so, it would be natural to think that groups should likewise be                           6
epistemically risk-averse, that is, that they should place more weight on negative                       
reliability than on positive reliability. 
BAF  Positive reliability  Negative reliability 
Unanimity voting     
Majority voting 
 
Table 1: A group’s positive and negative reliability as a function of its size (n) and member                                 
reliability (r), depending on whether the group uses unanimity or majority voting. 
     Positive reliability          Negative reliability 
          
⸺ Unanimity voting        ‐‑‐‐‑‐‑ Majority voting 
Figure 1: ​A group’s positive reliability (left graph) and negative reliability (right graph) as a                             
function of the members’ reliability, r (setting n = 9, for illustration). 
However, we don’t think this parity between individuals and groups can be easily                         
maintained. Note that the idea that individuals should place more weight on                       
error-avoidance than on truth-seeking is usually motivated on distinctly ​epistemic                   
grounds, e.g., by appeal to considerations about the irrationality of contradictory                     
6 See, e.g. Dorst (2019) and Easwaran (2016). See also Skipper (forthcoming), Steinberger (2019), and                             
Hewson (forthcoming) for critical discussion of this idea. 
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 beliefs (Dorst 2019, p. 185), the rationality of suspending judgment (Easwaran 2016,                       
p. 824), or the rationality of imprecise credences (Konek forthcoming). By contrast,                       
the kinds of considerations that are naturally taken to bear on questions about what                           
BAF it would be advisable for a group to use are often ​practical ​in nature. Here are                                 
three hypothetical (but, we hope, not too far-fetched) examples: 
Criminal Trial: The jury in a criminal trial must reach a collective verdict about                           
whether the defendant is guilty. The jury is required to deem the defendant guilty                           
iff all of the jurors believe that the defendant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.                           
This unanimity procedure is justified on the grounds that it is much more                         
important to avoid punishing the innocent than it is to punish the guilty. 
Quiz Show: A group of friends appear on a quiz show. The host asks the group                               
to collectively answer ​yes​, ​no​, or ​pass in response to a series of questions. Each right                               
answer gives +1 point, each wrong answer gives -1 point, and no points are                           
awarded or subtracted if the group says “pass.” The friends decide to base their                           
answers on simple majority voting on the grounds that they suspect this to                         
maximize their expected score. 
Anti-Terror Unit: An anti-terror police unit must decide whether to treat an                       
apparent threat as real. The unit conforms to a policy of treating apparent threats                           
as real as long as at least ​one ​member of the unit believes that the threat is real. The                                     
rationale behind this policy is that it’s much worse to treat a real threat as merely                               
apparent than to treat a merely apparent threat as real. 
In each case, the group’s choice of BAF seems perfectly reasonable given the                         
circumstances in which the group is to form a collective verdict. Yet, only in the first                               
case does the group place more weight on negative reliability than on positive                         
reliability. In the two other cases, the group places at least as much weight on positive                               
reliability as on negative reliability.  
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 We take this to suggest that, whatever might be said about the epistemic priorities                           
of individuals, there isn’t is a unique trade-off between positive and negative reliability                         
that groups should always try to make. It seems much more plausible to suppose, as                             
we’ll henceforth do, that different contexts call out for different epistemic priorities,                       
and hence different BAFs.  7
3. The Epistemic Priority Problem 
With these preliminaries in place, we are now ready to show how the Epistemic                           
Priority Problem can arise within a simple aggregation framework. We begin by                       
making some additional idealizing assumptions, which will help to simplify the                     
exposition (the assumptions will be relaxed later on). 
First, we assume that the ​agenda​—that is, the set of propositions that the group                           
members are to form beliefs about—consists of just a single proposition, ​p​. This allows                           
us to sidestep certain problems that can arise when the agenda contains two or more                             
logically interconnected propositions (as exemplified in the famous ​doctrinal paradox​).                 
These problems are of obvious interest and importance in their own right, but they                             8
are orthogonal to our present concerns. 
Second, we assume that all group members are (and consider themselves to be)                         
epistemic peers with respect to ​p​. We will take this to mean that all group members have                                 
the same positive and negative reliability: that is, no two members differ in their                           
positive reliability, and no two members differ in their negative reliability.                     9
Furthermore, we’ll assume that each group member has the same positive and negative                         
7 There are also less practically founded reasons to think that no one BAF will fare well in all contexts;                                       
reasons coming from various impossibility results in social choice theory (see Pacuit (2019) and List                             
(2013) for overviews). See also Kelly (2013), Horowitz (2017), and Pettigrew (2016) for recent                           
discussions of how rational individuals might trade off the Jamesian goals of truth-seeking and                           
error-avoidance in different ways. 
8 See List and Pettit (2002). 
9 One might instead adopt an “evidentialist” notion of epistemic peerhood, whereby two agents are said                               
to be epistemic peers with respect to ​p iff they have the same evidence about ​p ​and are equally competent                                       
at judging how that evidence bears on ​p​. This notion of epistemic peerhood has often been operative in                                   
the “peer disagreement” literature (e.g., Christensen 2007). As previously noted, we suspect that the                           
Epistemic Priority Problem (or a very similar problem) will arise equally for such an evidentialist notion                               
of peerhood, but we won’t here try to defend this claim in any detail. 
9 
 reliability, ​r​, where ​r ​> 50% (which is just to say that the group members are at least                                   
slightly more reliable than the flip of a fair coin). 
Third, we assume that all group members practice a particularly strong form of                         
conciliationism akin to the familiar “Equal Weight View” defended by Christensen                     
(2007), Elga (2007), and others. More specifically, we’ll assume that the group                       
members “split the difference” in response to peer disagreement. This is clearly not the                           
only available interpretation of the Equal Weight View, nor perhaps the most plausible                         
one. But the exact interpretation of the Equal Weight View won’t matter for present                           10
purposes. As we’ll see, the Epistemic Priority Problem can in any case arise in much less                               
conciliatory environments. 
Fourth, we assume that the reliability of any given member doesn’t depend on                         
how confident that member is that his or her opinion is correct. In other words,                             
members with ​more extreme credences are assumed to be neither more nor less reliable                           
than members with ​less extreme credences. This assumption may seem egregiously                     
unrealistic. (Wouldn’t it be more realistic to assume that people who are highly                         
confident in their opinion on some matter are also more likely to be correct about that                               
matter?) But the assumption isn’t meant to be realistic, since (as we’ll see) the                           
Epistemic Priority Problem can in any case arise without it. For now, we are just                             
looking to make things as simple as possible. 
Finally, we’ll work with a very sparse set of possible degrees of confidence (or                           
“credences”). More specifically, we will assume that each group member is either                       
slightly more confident of ​p ​than ~​p ​(which we’ll write as “​Cr​(​p​) > ​Cr​(~​p​)”) or ​much                               
more ​confident of ​p ​than ~​p (which we’ll write as “​Cr​(​p​) ≫ ​Cr​(~​p​)”). The converse is                               
obviously also allowed: members may be ​slightly less ​confident of ​p ​than ~​p ​(written                           
“​Cr​(​p​) < ​Cr​(~​p​)”) or ​much less ​confident of ​p ​than ~​p (written “​Cr​(​p​) ≪ ​Cr​(~​p​)”). One                               
small complication of this way of modelling credences is that it doesn’t involve real                           
numbers, which means that the idea of “splitting the difference” can’t be taken to                           
mean “taking the arithmetic mean.” All we need to assume in what follows, however, is                             
10 See, e.g., Fitelson and Jehle (2009) and Rasmussen et al. (2018). 
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 that if you’re ​much less confident of ​p ​than ~​p while I’m ​slightly more ​confident of ​p                                 
than ~​p​, then the way for us to split the difference is by both becoming ​slightly less                                 
confident of ​p ​than ~​p​. And, conversely, if you’re ​much more confident of ​p ​than ~​p                               
while I’m ​slightly less ​confident of ​p ​than ~​p​, then the way for us to split the difference                                   
is by both becoming ​slightly more ​confident of ​p ​than ~​p​. 
Taken together, these assumptions make for a highly idealized setting in which to                         
study the Epistemic Priority Problem. This should not be taken to suggest that the                           
Epistemic Priority Problem is a mere theoretical curiosity with little practical relevance.                       
As already mentioned, we’ll eventually argue that the problem can arise under much                         
less idealized circumstances as well. But we’d like to begin by showing how the                           
problem can arise in a very clean and simple setting. 
To show this, we’ll proceed in a case-based manner. Each of the cases will feature a                               
group whose members start out with a given set of individual credences in ​p​—we’ll call                             
them their ​pre-conciliation ​credences. The group will then undergo a ​conciliation                     
process​, whereby the members learn about each others’ credences and respond to any                         
potential disagreements by splitting the difference in the way described. As a result, the                           
members end up with identical credences in ​p ​once the conciliation process is                         
completed—we’ll call them their ​post-conciliation ​credences. 
That’s the basic setup. Now for the cases (of which there are three). 
Case 1: Unanimity Voting 
Consider a group with the following characteristics (in addition to those listed above): 
(i)  The group consists of two same-sized subgroups, ​g​1​ and ​g​2​. 
(ii)  The group members’ pre-conciliation and post-conciliation credences in ​p are                   
as stated in Table 2. 
(iii) The group uses unanimity voting: that is, the group believes ​p ​iff all of its                             
members believe ​p​. 
Let’s begin by asking: what does the group believe about ​p before and after the                             
conciliation process? Before the conciliation process, all members of ​g​1 ​are more                       
11 
 confident of ​p ​than ​~p​, and so they all believe ​p​. By contrast, all members of ​g​2 ​are more                                     
confident of ​~p ​than ​p​, and so they all believe ​~p​. Hence, due to the lack of unanimity,                                   
the group as a whole neither believes ​p ​nor believes ~​p​.  
However, note that the members of ​g​1 all start out being ​much more confident of ​p                               
than ​~p​, whereas the members of ​g​2 start out being only ​slightly more confident of ​~p                               
than ​p​. As a result, the members of ​g​1 and ​g​2​, after having conciliated with each other,                                 
all end up being slightly more confident of ​p than ​~p​. Consequently, the group as a                               
whole ends up believing ​p​ after the conciliation process is completed. 
  g​1  g​2 
Pre-conciliation  Cr​(​p​) ≫ ​Cr​(~​p​)  Cr​(​p​) < ​Cr​(~​p​) 
Post-conciliation  Cr​(​p​) > ​Cr​(~​p​) 
Table 2: Before the conciliation process, all members of g​1 are much more confident of                             
p than ~p, whereas all members of g​2 are slightly more confident of ~p than p. After                                 
the conciliation process, all group members are slightly more confident in p than ~p. 
This change in the group’s belief state may not seem like much of a problem. But                               
consider what has happened to the group’s positive and negative reliability,                     
respectively. Recall that the distinctive feature of unanimity voting is that it secures a                           
high negative reliability in comparison to other BAFs (e.g., in comparison to majority                         
voting, as illustrated by Figure 1). In other words, unanimity voting is supposed to be                             
an effective guard against false belief. But the conciliation process puts a crack in the                             
guard: it leads the group to form a new belief which, in turn, introduces a new                               
error-possibility. Now, the mere introduction of a new error-possibility obviously isn’t                     
enough to show that the group’s negative reliability has decreased as a result of the                             
conciliation process. We also need to consider whether any existing error-possibilities                     
have been eliminated. This would be the case if the conciliation process made the                           
group drop an existing belief. But since the group starts out neither believing ​p ​nor                             
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 believing ~​p​, there is no such belief to be dropped. This is the qualitative reason why                               11
the conciliation process harms the group’s negative reliability: it introduces a new                       
error-possibility without eliminating any existing ones. 
How significant is this problem from a quantitative point of view? To get a feel                             
for this, let’s put some numbers on the table. Suppose that ​g​1 ​and ​g​2 ​each have 5                                 
members (​n ​= 10), and suppose that all members have a positive reliability and negative                             
reliability of 70% (​r ​= .7). We can then ask: once the conciliation process is completed,                               
how likely is it that the group’s belief that ​p ​is false? In other words, how likely is it that                                       
p ​is false ​given the members’ post-conciliation beliefs about ​p​? On the face of it, this                               
might seem like an intractable question, since we haven’t said anything about how the                           
conciliation process might affect the reliability of the group members. But we can                         
approach the question in a more indirect way, by considering a slightly different                         
question: how likely is ​p ​to be false given the members’ pre-conciliation beliefs about                           
p​? This is a question that we ​can answer. But before we do, let’s explain why the two                                   
questions must have the same answer. 
Suppose that you’re a third party—someone not a member of the group in                         
question—who seeks to use the group members’ beliefs about ​p ​as evidence bearing on                           
p​. And let’s say that, upon learning about the group members’ pre-conciliation beliefs                         
about ​p​, you should have such-and-such a credence in ​p​. Now suppose you learn that                             
the group members have been through a conciliation process: that is, you learn that the                             
group members have adopted their average credence in ​p (and that’s ​all you learn).                           
Should you revise your credence in ​p in light of this new piece of information? It seems                                 
not. After all, the mere fact that the group members have conciliated doesn’t seem to                             
have any bearing on whether ​p ​is true or false. This suggests that there is no difference                                 
between, on the one hand, the probability that ​p ​is false given the group members’                             
post-conciliation ​beliefs about ​p​, and, on the other hand, the probability that ​p ​is false                             
11 More generally: as long as the group uses unanimity voting, it’s impossible for the conciliation process                                 
to eliminate any existing error-possibilities, since, if the members unanimously agree on a proposition                           
prior to the conciliation process, they will also unanimously agree on that proposition after ​the                             
conciliation process. 
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 given the group members’ ​pre-conciliation ​beliefs about ​p​. Hence, to determine the                       
former probability, we need only determine the latter. 
What, then, ​is ​the probability that ​p ​is false given the group members’                         
pre-conciliation beliefs about ​p​? In the case at hand, the answer is simply “50%” since                             
there are equally many, equally reliable members who believe ​p ​and ​~p​, respectively.                         12
Thus, the group ends up with a belief that, by the lights of its own members, is no                                   
more likely to be true than false. This already looks like a severe blow to the group’s                                 
negative reliability.  
We can harden the blow even more by considering just how unlikely ​~p would                           
have to be in order for the group to believe ​p before the ​conciliation process. The                               
relevant scenario is one where all ten group members falsely believe ​p​, which, in spite of                               
their relatively modest reliability, is extremely unlikely: (1 – ​r​)​n = (1 – .7)​10 = .000006.                               
Thus, the conciliatory effects of in-group disagreement can in fact have a very                         
significant, adverse impact on a group’s negative reliability. 
There is, however, a positive flip side: the ​decrease in negative reliability is                         
accompanied by an ​increase in positive reliability. The qualitative reason is the same as                           
above: given that the group uses unanimity voting, it isn’t possible for the conciliation                           
process to eliminate any existing, potentially true beliefs. By contrast, it ​is ​possible for                           
the conciliation process to introduce a new, potentially true belief. Hence, the group’s                         
positive reliability goes up. 
This also brings out a more general lesson about the problem we’re facing. The                           
problem isn’t so much that the conciliatory effects of in-group disagreement can harm                         
a group’s ​overall ​reliability (although this may sometimes be the case, depending on                         
how we determine an agent’s “overall” reliability on the basis of the agent’s positive                           
reliability and negative reliability). Rather, the problem is that the conciliatory effects                       
of in-group disagreement can lead to the frustration of a group’s preferred trade-off                         
between positive and negative reliability. That’s why we began by naming it the                         
“Epistemic Priority Problem.” 
12 Assuming that the prior probability of ​p ​is 50%. 
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 Case 2: Inverse Unanimity Voting 
The same general problem can arise for groups that place more weight on positive                           
reliability than negative reliability. Consider a group with the same characteristics as                       
the one above except that it uses a different BAF: 
(i)  The group consists of two same-sized subgroups, ​g​1​ and ​g​2​. 
(ii)  The group members’ pre-conciliation and post-conciliation credences in ​p are                   
as stated in Table 2. 
(iii) The group uses (what we’ll call) “inverse” unanimity voting: that is, the group                         
believes ​p ​iff at least one of its members believes ​p​. 
The operative BAF here—inverse unanimity voting—is less familiar than, say,                   
unanimity voting or majority voting. It has some rather odd properties. For example, it                           
entails that a group believes both ​p ​and ~​p ​whenever its members do not unanimously                             
agree about whether ​p is true or false. Yet, this is precisely what makes inverse                             
unanimity voting conducive to a high positive reliability: just as unanimity voting is an                           
effective way of avoiding false beliefs, inverse unanimity voting is an effective way of                           
gaining true ones. 
Let’s ask again: what does the group believe about ​p before and after the                           
conciliation process, respectively? Before the conciliation process, the group believes                   
both ​p ​and ~​p​, since the members do not unanimously agree about whether ​p is true or                                 
false (more specifically: all members of ​g​1 ​believe ​p​, whereas all members of ​g​2 ​believe                             
~​p​). But after the conciliation process is completed, the members unanimously agree                       
that ​p ​is true. As a result, the group drops its belief in ~​p​, but retains its belief in ​p​. 
What has happened to the group’s positive and negative reliability here? On the                         
one hand, the group’s positive reliability has decreased, since the group has dropped a                           
potentially true belief without forming any new ones. On the other hand, the group’s                           
negative reliability has increased, since the group has eliminated an existing                     
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 error-possibility without introducing any new ones. Thus, the group’s epistemic                   
priorities are once again frustrated.  13
Case 3: Majority Voting 
What about groups that place ​equal weight on positive and negative reliability? Can                         
the problem arise for such groups as well? The short answer is “yes.” But the details are                                 
a bit different from the previous two cases. Consider a group with the following                           
characteristics: 
(i) The group consists of two subgroups, ​g​1 and ​g​2​, where ​g​1 has 4 members, and ​g​2                               
has 5 members. 
(ii)  The group members’ pre-conciliation and post-conciliation credences in ​p are                   
as stated in Table 2. 
(iii)  The group uses majority voting: that is, the group believes ​p ​iff more than half                             
of its members believe ​p (which secures an equal weighing of positive and                         
negative reliability, as illustrated by Figure 1). 
What does the group believe about ​p ​before and after the conciliation process,                         
respectively? Before the conciliation process, the group believes ​p​, since all members of                         
the majority group, ​g​2​, believe ​p​. But since the members of the minority group, ​g​1​, are                               
much more confident of ~​p ​than ​p​, whereas the members of ​g​2 are only ​slightly more                               
confident of ​p ​than ~​p​, the result of the conciliation process is that all members of the                                 
combined group end up being slightly more confident of ~​p ​than ​p​. So, after the                             
conciliation process is completed, the group believes ~​p​. 
What has happened to the group’s reliability here? Consider first the group’s                       
negative reliability. One effect of the conciliation process is that the group drops its                           
belief in ​p​, which eliminates an existing error-possibility. But the group also forms a                           
new belief in ~​p​, which introduces a new error-possibility. These opposing effects                       
13 For a quantitative example pertaining to Case 2, the calculations provided in connection with Case 1                                 
carry over, ​mutatis mutandis​, to the present case. We omit the details. 
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 might be thought to “cancel each other out,” so as to leave the group’s negative                             
reliability unaffected. But things are a little more complicated than that.  
Here is why: before the conciliation process, the majority group is more likely                         
than the minority group to be right (assuming, as we do, that ​r > 50%). Thus, the                                 14
conciliation process effectively leads the group to trade a belief that is ​less likely ​to be                               
false for a belief that is ​more likely to be false, which means that the group’s negative                                 
reliability decreases. The same goes for the groups’ positive reliability: it also decreases,                         
since the group effectively trades a belief that is ​more likely to be true for a belief that is                                     
less likely ​to be true. This stands in contrast to the previous two cases, where the                               
group’s positive/negative reliability decreased, whereas the group’s negative/positive               
reliability increased, thereby leaving the group’s ​overall ​reliability (at least potentially)                     
untouched.  15
However, this result should be taken with a pinch of salt. As we’ll see in the next                                 
section, the result is sensitive to our background assumptions in a way that the                           
previous two results are not. (More specifically: it doesn’t fully generalize to settings                         
where a high level of confidence is indicative of a high reliability.) Thus, we still take                               
the main upshot of the foregoing considerations to be that the conciliatory effects of                           
in-group disagreement can lead to the frustration of a group’s epistemic priorities                       
(rather than necessarily damage the group’s overall reliability). 
4. Generalizing the Epistemic Priority Problem 
We have now seen how the Epistemic Priority Problem can arise in a highly idealized                             
setting. The next thing we’d like to do is to generalize the problem by showing how it                                 
can arise even without the various idealizing assumptions introduced in the previous                       
section. We will skip over some of the assumptions that clearly aren’t responsible for                           
14 This is a consequence of Condorcet’s famous jury theorem (Condorcet 1785). For an accessible                             
modern discussion of the result and its implications, see Goodin and Spiekermann (2018).  
15 A different but related point has been made by Hazlett (2016), who argues that the probability with                                   
which majority voting yields the correct result may be harmed if the voters defer to each other’s beliefs                                   
prior to voting, because this compromises the “independence” assumption underlying the Condorcet                       
jury theorem. 
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 the problem (e.g., the assumption that suspension of judgment isn’t allowed, and the                         
assumption that there are only two levels of comparative confidence). This leaves us                         
with three assumptions to consider. 
The first assumption is the one saying that the reliability of any given member is                             
independent of how confident that member is that his or her opinion is correct. There                             
are two general ways in which this assumption might be modified: either (i) by                           
assuming that members with more extreme credences are more reliable than members                       
with less extreme credences, or (ii) by assuming that members with more extreme                         
credences are less reliable than members with less extreme credences. While the latter of                           
these dependencies might well obtain in certain kinds of situations, we’ll focus our                         16
attention on the former dependency here, since this carries no obvious presumption of                         
irrationality on part of the individual group members.   17
So, let’s assume that members with more extreme credences are also more reliable,                         
and let’s ask: how, if at all, does this change affect the results from the previous section                                 
(other things being equal)? There are three cases to consider. 
In Case 1, the Epistemic Priority Problem still shows up, albeit with mitigated                         
strength. The basic mechanism is the same as before: the group’s negative reliability                         
decreases, since the group forms a new belief, which introduces a new error-possibility.                         
But since the members of ​g​1 ​are more confident (and hence, by present assumptions,                           
more reliable) than the members of ​g​2​, the group’s negative reliability doesn’t suffer as                           
much as before. In particular, the group now ends up with a belief that, by the lights of                                   
its own members, is at least slightly more likely to be true than false (unlike the original                                 
16 For example, one might wonder whether the dependency sometimes obtains as a consequence of the                               
well-documented “Dunning-Kruger” effect, whereby (roughly) people who are less competent on a                       
given matter are more prone to overestimating their own competence (Dunning and Kruger 1999). 
17 A small aside on this point: psychological studies have documented a robust and widespread                             
“overconfidence bias,” whereby people’s confidence in their answers to a wide range of tests tends to                               
exceed the actual frequency with which their answers are correct (Lichtenstein et al. 1982; Hoffrage                             
2004). In other words, of the answers people are ​n​% confident in, less than ​n​% are true. One might be                                       
tempted to see this overconfidence effect as evidence ​against the claim that a high confidence is typically                                 
indicative of a high reliability. However, this would be too quick. Something much stronger would be                               
needed to show this, namely, that if we compare the answers people are ​n​% confident to the answers                                   
they are >​n​% confident in, a higher proportion of the former answers are true. As far as we know, there                                       
is no evidence to support this stronger claim. 
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 case where the group ended up with a belief that, by the lights of its own members, was                                   
no more likely to be true than false). 
The same goes, ​mutatis mutandis​, for Case 2: the group’s positive reliability still                         
decreases, since the group drops a belief, which eliminates an existing possibility of                         
being right. But since the members of ​g​1 ​are more confident (and hence, by present                             
assumptions, more reliable) than the members of ​g​2​, the group’s positive reliability                       
doesn’t suffer as much as before. 
By contrast, the Epistemic Priority Problem need no longer arise in Case 3. The                           
reason for this is that the members of the minority group, ​g​1​, are (by present                             
assumptions) more reliable than the members of the majority group, ​g​2​, which means                         
that it’s no longer clear that the majority group is initially (that is, prior to the                               
conciliation process) more likely to be right than the minority group. Rather, what                         
subgroup is more likely to be right is going to depend on how much more reliable the                                 
members of the ​g​1 are assumed to be than the members of ​g​2​. Thus, although the                               
Epistemic Priority Problem will still arise on ​some ways of filling in the details of the                               
case, the problem is no longer inevitable. 
The next assumption we’d like to consider is the one saying that all group                           
members are epistemic peers. As many authors have pointed out, this condition is                         
rarely (if ever) met in real life. It is therefore natural to wonder whether the Epistemic                               18
Priority Problem is affected (one way or the other) by relaxing the peerhood                         
assumption. So, let’s assume that the group members may differ in reliability, and let’s                           
also assume (which seems reasonable from an epistemic viewpoint) that members who                       
are more reliable are also accorded more weight by the group’s BAF. How, if at all,                               
does this change affect the Epistemic Priority Problem (other things being equal)? 
In Case 1, the Epistemic Priority Problem still arises with unmitigated strength.                       
The reason for this is that the introduction of differential weights has no effect on the                               
output of unanimity voting: all members still have to agree on ​p ​in order for the group                                 
to believe ​p​. In consequence, the group’s negative reliability still decreases as a result of                             
18 See, e.g., King (2012). 
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 the group forming a new belief, which introduces a new error-possibility. And, at least                           
insofar as there is no reason to think that the members of ​g​1 ​are systematically more or                                 
less reliable than the members of ​g​2​, there is no reason to think that the group’s                               
negative reliability suffers any more or less than in the original case. 
The same goes, ​mutatis mutandis​, for Case 2: the introduction of differential                       
weights has no effect on the output of inverse unanimity voting, which means that the                             
group’s positive reliability still decreases as a result of dropping an existing, potentially                         
true belief. And given that there is no reason to think that the members of ​g​1 ​are                                 
systematically more or less reliable than the members of ​g​2​, there is no reason to think                               
that the group’s positive reliability suffers any more or less than in the original case. 
Things get a bit more complicated in Case 3, since the introduction of differential                           
weights ​can ​affect the output of majority voting. Whether it ​does ​affect the output in                             
the case at hand depends on the specific weight allocation. It would take us too far                               
astray to enter a detailed discussion of how different types of weight allocation would                           
affect the Epistemic Priority Problem. But we’d like to consider one particularly                       
natural weight allocation (or class of weight allocations) which turns out to have the                           
potential to mitigate the Epistemic Priority Problem, at least to some extent. On this                           
way of allocating weight, members with more extreme credences are given more weight                         
than members with less extreme credences. The rationale behind this weight allocation                       
is supposed to be that people who are more confident in their beliefs are also more                               
likely to be right in their beliefs. As mentioned, this dependency might not always hold                             
true. But we find it realistic enough in many cases for it to be worthwhile considering                               
how the Epistemic Priority Problem might be affected by it. 
The first thing to observe is that it’s no longer clear what the group believes before                               
the conciliation process, since the members of the minority group have more extreme                         
credences (and hence, given present assumptions, are given more weight) than the                       
members of the majority group. Rather, whether the group as a whole initially (that is,                             
prior to the conciliation process) agrees with the majority group or the minority group                           
20 
 is going to depend on how much more weight is placed on the beliefs of the minority                                 
group than on the members of the majority group. This gives us two cases to consider. 
The first (and simplest) case is the one where the group as a whole initially agrees                               
with the minority group. Here it’s clear that the Epistemic Priority Problem no longer                           
arises, since the conciliation process leads to no change in the group’s belief state, and                             
hence leaves the group’s positive and negative reliability unaffected. 
The second (and slightly more complicated) case is the one where the group as a                             
whole initially agrees with the majority group. Given this, the conciliation process ​does                         
lead to a change in the group’s belief state, since all members still end up agreeing with                                 
the minority belief once the conciliation process is completed. However, given that the                         
members of the minority group are more reliable than those of the majority group, it’s                             
not immediately clear whether the group’s reliability increases or decreases. Rather,                     
whether the group’s reliability increases or decreases depends on whether the majority                       
group is initially more or less likely to be right than the minority group. And this, in                                 
turn, depends on just how much more reliable the members of the minority group are                             
assumed to be than those of the majority group. Thus, the Epistemic Priority Problem                           
may or may not arise, depending on how we fill in the details of the case. 
The third (and final) assumption we want to discuss concerns the particular                       
version of conciliationism practiced by the group members. Until now, we have                       
assumed that the group members practice a form of “splitting the difference.”                       
However, there are various weaker versions of conciliationism which have been                     
defended in the literature (perhaps the best-known example being Kelly’s (2010)                     
“Total Evidence View”). This makes it natural to wonder whether the Epistemic                       
Priority Problem can also arise in more moderate conciliatory environments. So, let’s                       
suppose that the group members practice a moderate form of conciliationism: that is,                         
they don’t split the difference, but they do revise their credence at least to some extent                               
in the face of peer disagreement. How, if at all, does this change affect the Epistemic                               
Priority Problem (other things being equal)? 
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 The answer, to a first approximation, is the same in all three cases: the Epistemic                             
Priority Problem can still arise, but it does so in a more limited range of cases. A little                                   
more precisely: the Epistemic Priority Problem still shows up as long as the members                           
practice a form of conciliationism that is strong enough to ensure that all members end                             
up favoring the same proposition once the conciliation process is completed. What                       
counts as “strong enough” is going to depend on the pre-conciliation credences of the                           
group members. For example, in Case 1, a fairly weak form of conciliationism will                           
suffice to generate the Epistemic Priority Problem, since all members of ​g​1 are ​much                           
more ​confident of ​p ​than ~​p​, while all members of ​g​2 ​are only ​slightly more confident of                                 
~​p than ​p​. By contrast, if some of the members of ​g​2 ​had instead been ​much more                                 
confident of ~​p than ​p​, we would have needed a stronger form of conciliationism to                             
generate the problem. Thus, although the Epistemic Priority Problem is most                     
prevalent in highly conciliatory environments, it can arise in more moderate                     
conciliatory environments as well. 
5. Solving the Epistemic Priority Problem 
Although not the main focus of the chapter, we’d like to close on a more positive note                                 
by offering a tentative proposal for how to solve the Epistemic Priority Problem                         
without rejecting conciliationism. The proposal relies on a distinction that has come                       
up in various forms in the recent “higher-order evidence” literature: a distinction                       
between, on the one hand, an agent’s ​credence in ​p​, and, on the other hand, (what we’ll                                 
call) the agent’s ​first-order judgment ​as to whether ​p​.  
An agent’s first-order judgment as to whether ​p​, as we’ll understand it, is the                           
agent’s judgment of how likely it is that ​p ​is true given the first-order evidence available                               
to the agent. We won’t here try to say anything very precise about what counts as                               19
“first-order evidence,” but, as a minimum, the mere fact that someone disagrees with                         
you is supposed to ​not ​count as first-order evidence, but is rather supposed to count as                               
19 Variations on the notion of a first-order judgment have been employed by, e.g., Barnett (2019, §4)                                 
who talks about your “disagreement-insulated inclination” toward ​p​, and Worsnip (ms, §4) who talks                           
about your “personal take” on whether ​p​. 
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 a (higher-order) reason for you to doubt the reliability of your judgment of what your                             
first-order evidence supports.  20
Now, in many cases your credence in ​p will line up (at least roughly) with your                               
first-order judgment as to whether ​p​. For example, if it seems to you on the basis of                                 
your visual experience that it’s raining outside, you will normally be quite confident                         
that it’s raining outside. Sometimes, however, your credence may come apart from                       
your first-order judgment, precisely because you have reason to doubt the accuracy of                         
your own first-order judgment. This is what can happen in cases of disagreement. 
Suppose, for example, that you disagree with a trusted colleague about how                       
strongly a given body of meteorological data supports the proposition that (​p​) it’s                         
going to rain this afternoon. In your judgment, the data strongly supports ​p​. In your                             
colleagues judgment, the data strongly supports ~​p​. Setting aside the fact that your                         
colleague disagrees with you on this particular occasion, you don’t consider your                       
judgment to be any more or less likely to be accurate than your colleague’s. Thus, you                               
adopt a relatively low credence in ​p ​(say, around 50%), not because you have been                             
persuaded by your colleagues first-order considerations, but because the disagreement                   
itself has led you to doubt the accuracy of your own first-order judgment. 
Distinction in hand, here is the proposal in rough outline: rather than aggregating                         
the group members’ ​credences in ​p​, let’s instead aggregate their ​first-order judgments ​as                         
to whether ​p​. Doing so would block the Epistemic Priority Problem by preventing the                           
conciliatory effects of in-group disagreement from having any impact on the group’s                       
belief state in the first place (since the group members’ first-order judgments are not                           
supposed to be sensitive to higher-order considerations). And it would at the same time                           
allow the group to take advantage of various other deliberative activities like knowledge                         
sharing and critical argumentation (since the group members’ first-order judgments are                     
supposed to be sensitive to first-order considerations).  
20 For more detailed characterizations of the distinction between “first-order evidence” and                       
“higher-order evidence,” see Christensen (2010), Lasonen-Aarnio (2014), and Skipper (2019; ms). 
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 The hope, then, is that by aggregating first-order judgments rather than credences,                       
we can at once (i) avoid the Epistemic Priority Problem, (ii) retain conciliationism, and                           
(iii) reap the epistemic benefits of group deliberation. Needless to say, there are various                           
concerns one might have about the concrete implementation of this proposal. Most                       
obviously, it is not immediately clear how easy it will be to elicit people’s first-order                             
judgments in real-world settings (say, a typical voting scenario). We are not ourselves in                           
a position to give an informed assessment of the practical feasibility of the proposed                           
solution. For now, we are content to leave the proposal on the table for our joint                               
consideration. 
6. Conclusion 
Here, then, is the main takeaway: conciliatory views of disagreement have a disturbing                         
feature. The trouble is that conciliatory responses to in-group disagreement can lead to                         
the frustration of a group’s ​epistemic priorities​: that is, the group’s favoured trade-off                         
between the “Jamesian goals” of truth-seeking and error-avoidance. This is what we                       
called the “Epistemic Priority Problem.” The problem is most prevalent in highly                       
conciliatory environments, but it can in principle arise whenever the members of a                         
group practice at least a minimal form of conciliationism. Thus, we take the problem                           
raised to flow from all versions of conciliationism, albeit with different severity.  
As mentioned at the outset, this is not to say that conciliationism, understood as a                             
view about how individuals should revise their beliefs in response to disagreement, is                         
undermined (partly or wholly) by the Epistemic Priority Problem. The considerations                     
put forth in this chapter might just show that the true epistemic norms for individual                             
believers sometimes have adverse epistemic consequences at the group level. If so, a                         
solution along the lines of the one outlined in §5 may be particularly apt, since it                               
doesn’t force us to give up conciliationism. But in any case, it seems to us that we need                                   
to face up to the problem raised in one way or another. 
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